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Abstract: This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-
Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median 
Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, 
monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval 
voting system. 
Keywords: Aggregation, Approval Voting, Borda Majority Count, Majority Judgment, Social 
Choice Function. 
1. Introduction 
Election corresponds to the process by which individuals perform a choice which is 
expressed through vote, with aim of designating one or more individuals who will have the 
responsibility to occupy a political office (trade-union or administrative) (Jean, 2012). 
Several models were proposed to fulfill  this task but Arrow's one (Arrow, 1951 ; Arrow, 
1963) induced two paradoxes (Condorcet and Arrow's paradoxes) both insurmountable in 
theory and impossible to circumvent in practice. Social Choice Theory is, for this purpose, 
devoted to a reverse whatever the provided efforts because it is hardly able to solve the problem 
at its origin. We can advance a quite rational explanation to this constant impossibility 
confession and its corollary: 
 Cause: the traditional model is inadequate because expressions of the allowed opinions to 
judges (ex-voters) are unsuited and insufficient 
 Consequence: the theory which springs from is incoherent and contradictory. 
Consequently, on the basis of this conviction, it is advisable to consider a new theory which 
pushes back the fixed limits of the arrovian framework. Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki 
undertook various works in this direction to propose a new framework not based on decision 
makers' individual preferences but on their evaluations (Balinski & Laraki, 2007 ; Balinski & 
Laraki, 2010 ; Balinski & Laraki, 2012). 
Thus, the Balinski-Larakian model requires from actors to make a judgment on each 
candidate in competition. In this meaning, it is more realistic to call actors  “judges ” (rather 
than voters or electors). Candidates are then  “competitors”. 
The Balinski-Laraki's model was adopted by several other researchers in Economics and 
Operations Research; its main characteristic is that judges do not need a numerical scale to 
evaluate candidates. An ordinal nominal scale is enough so that the common usual language 
can be used to evaluate candidates. By doing so, several methods were born; let us quote most 
representative: 
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 Approval voting: each judge approves or disapproves each candidate. The winner is the 
one who obtains most approvals.  
 Evaluation voting: each judge allots a mark (or grade) to each candidate. The candidate 
who obtains the highest average or sum of marks is elected (Alcantud & Laruelle, 2014).  
 Borda Majority Count (BMC): it is an extent of evaluation voting where a specific tie-
breaking rule is used (see (Zahid, 2012)). 
 Majority Judgment (MJ): each judge allots a grade (ordinal or cardinal) to each candidate. 
The winner is the one who obtains the highest median. This function uses two tie-breaking 
rules: majority-grade and majority-gauge (see (Balinski & Laraki, 2007), (Balinski & 
Laraki, 2010) and (Balinski & Laraki, 2012)). 
 Mean-Median Compromise Method (MMCM): this method is obtained by hybridizing the 
BMC and the MJ. Its tie-breaking rule returns values of a sequence that converge to the 
result of BMC before using tie-breaking rule suggested by Manzoor Ahmed Zahid (see 
(Ngoie et al., 2014) and (Ngoie et al., 2015)). 
Interested reader can find more details in (Falco et al., 2011), (Falco et al., 2013), and (Falco 
et al., 2014). It is suitable to note that Balinski-Laraki's MJ is a redefinition of Basset and 
Persky's Robust Voting (Basset & Persky, 1999) in the balinski-larakian framework. 
The object of this paper is to isolate MMCM (see (Ngoie et al., 2014), and (Ngoie et al., 
2015)), state and show its essential characteristics. For this purpose, the paper is organized as 
follows: section 2 outlines the so-called social choice function MMCM, section 3 enumerates 
some of its properties in the form of shown theorems. Lastly, section 4 is devoted to remarks 
and conclusion. 
2. Outlines of mean-median compromise method (MMCM) 
This section outlines the MMCM method proposed by Ngoie, Ulungu and Savadogo in 
(Ngoie et al., 2014), and (Ngoie et al., 2015); there, didactic examples are also developped. 
Definition 2.1 (Amplitude of a division) Let N = {1, 2, … , n} be the set of n judges, we call 
amplitude of a division the real number:  
ρ =
n+1
2k
                                                                                                                                                                               (1) 
with k a whole number called “division degree”. 
Definition 2.2 (Intermedian grades) Let ai be a candidate or competitor with grade 
gi1, gi2, . . , gin such that gi1  ≥  gi2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  gin. A grade gij is called “intermedian” if and only 
if ∃m ∈  N (with 1 ≤  m ≤  2k − 1) such that [ρ. m]  =  j. Note that [ρ. m] is the whole 
number that is nearest to ρ. m and ρ the amplitude of division for a fixed division degree k. 
We note ℳk the set of non-redundant intermedian grades obtained from a division degree k. 
The so-defined ℳk  is the set of data involved in the Olympic average
1 calculation of points 
which are bounds (higher or lower) of 2k intervals obtained after division. 
Definition 2.3 (Average Majority Compromise) Let ai be a candidate or competitor with 
grades gi1, gi2, … , gin where gi1  ≥ gi2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  gin and  ℳk = {gi1
∗ , gi2
∗ , … , gij
∗ } the set of his 
or her intermedian grades obtained from division degreek. Then the “average majority 
compromise”, or “average majority evaluation” or “average majority rank” f mm(ai) is by 
definition: 
f mm(ai) =
1
j
∑ gim
∗j
m=1                                                                                                                                                   (2) 
                                                 
1 By Olympic average of 𝑛 numbers, we mean the arithmetic mean of these numbers when the two extreme values 
(largest and smallest) are excluded. 
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Example 2.1 If 5 judges assign grades 4, 8, 7, 9, 5 to ai. Suppose k = 2,  ρ =
5+1
22
=1.5 
When we arrange grades in descending order, we obtain: 9, 8, 7, 5, 4 
 ℳ2 = {f
[1×1.5],   f [2×1.5],   f [3×1.5]} = {f 2,   f 3,   f 5} = {8,   7,   4}  
Thus f mm(ai) =
8+7+4
3
=
19
3
= 6.33 
And if 8 judges allot grades 9, 7, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5, 8 to ai.  
For k = 3, ρ =
8+1
23
=1.125 
Classified grades in descending order are: 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 5, 4, 3 
ℳ3 = {f
[1×1.125],   f [2×1.125],   f [3×1.125], f [4×1.125], f [5×1.125], f [6×1.125], f [7×1.125]} 
                   = {f [1.125],   f [2.25],   f [3.375], f [4.5], f [5.625], f [6.75], f [7.875]} = { f 1, f 2, f 3, f 5, f 6, f 7, f 8} 
                    = {9, 8, 7, 5, 5, 4, 3}    
Therefore f mm(ai) =
9+8+7+5+5+4+3
7
=
41
7
 = 5.8 
2.1. Tie-breaking 
 
When average majority grades of two candidates are different, the one with the higher 
average majority grade naturally ranks ahead of the other. Majority ranking ≻𝑚𝑚 between two 
candidates evaluated by the same jury is determined by a repeated application of average 
majority ranking: 
 start with k = 2 
 if fk
mm(a) > fk
mm(b) then a ≻mm b 
 if fk
mm(a) = fk
mm(b) then the procedure is repeated for  k + 1. 
2.2. Ranking candidates with MMCM 
 
Let us take the following example to illustrate this procedure: 
Example 2.2 Let us suppose that a et b are evaluated by a 7-voter jury: 
a  : 85 73 78 90 69 70 71 
b  : 77 72 95 83 73 73 66 
The ordered profile is: 
a : 90 85 78 73 71 70 69 
b : 95 83 77 73 73 72 66 
ρ =
7+1
22
=
8
4
= 2  
 ℳ2 = {f
2, f 4, f 6}  
 ℳ2(a) = {85, 73, 70}  and  f2
mm(a) =
85 + 73 + 70
3
= 76 
 ℳ2(b) = {83, 73, 72}  and  f2
mm(b) =
83 + 73 + 72
3
= 76 
f2
mm(a) =  f2
mm(b) = 76. A tie-break occurs between 𝑎 and 𝑏. By definition, we repeat the 
procedure for k = 3 and obtain: 
ρ =
7+1
23
=
8
8
= 1  
 ℳ3 = { f
1, f 2, f 3, f 4, f 5, f 6, f 7}  
 ℳ3(a) = {90, 85, 78, 73, 71, 70, 69}  And  f3
mm(a) =
90+85+78+73+71+70+69
7
= 76.57 
 ℳ3(b) = {95, 83, 77, 73, 73, 72, 66}  And  f3
mm(b) =
95+83+77+73+73+72+66
7
= 77 
f3
mm(b) = 77 > f3
mm(a) = 76.57. Then  𝑏 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝑎. 
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In this example the average majority evaluation returns exactly the same result as the 
average. That is due to the fact that each candidate’s intermedian grades set is equal her or his 
grade set. 
Definition 2.4 (Maximum division index) Let 𝑎𝑖 be a candidate or competitor and  Gi =
{gi1, gi2, … , gin}    set of ai’s grades with gi1  ≥ gi2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  gin  and  ℳk = {gi1
∗ , gi2
∗ , … , gij
∗ } 
the set of her or his intermedian grades obtained with a division degree𝑘. Then, the smallest 
whole number k  such that  Gi =  ℳk is called “maximum division index” or “total division 
index”. It is denoted 𝜈. 
In example 2.2 stated above, the maximum division index is 𝜈 = 3. 
3. Properties of the MMCM 
First of all, let us notice that single member voting systems either with one or two rounds 
are used throughout the world for leaders' elections. Australia and Ireland cases which proceed 
to a complex method called transferable voting are likely to be considered as exceptions. To 
these exceptions, let us add Belgian case which uses a list-voting.  
All voting functions here-mentioned are designed in arrovian framework. They suffer from 
inconsistencies such that it would not be right to affirm that they reflect the will of the people. 
For us to convince some, it would be enough to observe paradoxical results of French 
presidential elections of 1995, 2002 and 2007: in all these elections were observed Arrow's 
paradox (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives), Condorcet-winner paradox and/or 
Condorcet-loser paradox (see e.g. (Durand, 2000 ; Felsenthal, 2012)). 
The so-called Social Choice Function MMCM was designed in order to avoid pitfalls of the 
previous voting functions. We show in this paper that most of paradoxes that affect these 
functions do not jeopardize the MMCM. 
Definition 3.1 (Neutrality) Aggregating function f is neutral if the winner between two or 
several candidates changes when all voters reverse their preferences (or evaluations). 
Neutrality idea requires that if preferences radically change, election winner must change, 
too. 
Theorem 3.1 MMCM is neutral. 
Proof : Let us consider an electorate 𝑁 = {1, 2, … , 𝑛} of 𝑛 voters (𝑛 ≥ 2). If two candidates 𝑥 
and 𝑦 are evaluated by these 𝑛 voters and their grades are respectively X = {g1x, g2x, … , gnx} 
and Y = {g1y, g2y, … , gny} where giα indicates the grade allotted by voter 𝑖 to candidate 𝛼 (𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑛 ; 𝛼 = 𝑥 or 𝑦).  
Suppose that f mm(X) > f mm(Y). Therefore x >mm y. 
If each voter reverses her or his evaluation (i.e. gix becomes giy and vice versa ∀ i = 1, … , n), 
the set of x’s grades becomes Y = {giy}i=1,…,n and y’s one becomes X =
{gix}i=1,…,n.  
We then obtain f mm(X) > f mm(Y)  ⟹ y >mm x    ∎ 
Note: Neutrality theorem was already established for MJ and BMC (Balinski & Laraki, 2007 ; 
Balinski & laraki, 2010 ; Zahid, 2012). A method obtained by hybridizing both above 
mentioned methods can only but fulfull this criterion. 
Definition 3.2  (Anonymity) Aggregating function f is anonymous if the winner between two 
or several candidates does not change even when voters are permuted. 
This definition indicates that if two voters exchange their ballot papers, the function must return 
the same result in both situations. 
Theorem 3.2 MMCM is anomymous. 
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Proof: Let x be a candidate whose set of grades allotted by n voters (n ≥ 2) is X =
{g1x, g2x, … , gnx}. If two voters i and j permute (i.e. gix becomes gjx and vice versa 
whatever  i, j = 1, … , n), X will not change.  
Thus f mm(X) which is x’s final evaluation by MMCM, will not change even if the voters were 
permuted. As x is unspecified, this remains true for any candidate ∎ 
Note: Even if this property seems to be weak, it is not fulfilled by districts-elections such as 
those implemented in the United States of America or proportional voting which is 
implemented in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for legislative elections and 
provincial ones. 
Definition 3.3 (Unanymity or Pareto-Consistency) Aggregating function f is unanimous if it 
always returns as the winning candidate between two or several candidates the one who is 
considered by all the voters to be the best. 
This definition suggests that when all the voters prefer a candidate to all of her or his 
opponents, this candidate should not, in any case, whatever would be the profile, likely to be 
losing. 
Theorem 3.3 : MMCM is Pareto-consistent. 
Proof: Let x and y be two candidates with respective grades Gx = {g1x, g2x, … , gnx} and Gy =
{g1y, g2y, … , gny} such that gix > giy  ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. 
We will obtain for a division degree k (with k ≥ 1): 
ℳk(x) = {g1x
∗ , g2x
∗ , … , gmx
∗  } And ℳk(y) = {g1y
∗ , g2y
∗ , … , gmy
∗ } (withm = 2k − 1) where 
ℳk(α) indicates the intermedian set of candidate α. 
Sincegix > giy  ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have g1x
∗ > g1y
∗   ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m and thus, 
1
m
∑ g1x
∗m
i=1  >
1
m
∑ g1y
∗m
i=1  ⟹ f
mm(x) > f mm(y)  ⟹ x >mm y     ∎ 
Definition 3.4 (Monotonicity) Aggregating function f is monotonic if it returns as winner a 
candidate with a profile p and keeps her or him as winner with a profile p' considering that in 
the last profile, at least one voter improved his grade for this candidate. 
A candidate should not decrease in the final ranking if at least one judge re-examined her or 
him by allotting a higher grade. 
 
Theorem 3.4 : MMCM is monotonic. 
 
Proof: Let x and y be two candidates with respective Gx = {g1x, g2x, … , gnx} and Gy =
{g1y, g2y, … , gny} such that f
mm(x) > f mm(y) (i. e.  x >mm y). 
Suppose that voter i having previously allotted grade gix to x re-evaluated her or him by allotting 
a grade gix
′  such that gix
′ > gix ceteris paribus. Three cases are then possible: 
 Grade gix
′  does not amend the overall constitution of intermedian grades  ℳk(x). f
mm(x) 
Remains the same and f mm(x) > f mm(y). 
 Grade gix
′  is an intermedian (i.e. voter i is pivotal) and fi
mm(x) which is x’s final evaluation 
by MMCM after taking into account the preference amendment of voter  i.  
Thus fi
mm(x) > f mm(x) > f mm(y) ⟹ fi
mm(x) > f mm(y) 
 Grade gix
′  is not intermedian but amends the overall constitution of intermedian 
grades  ℳk(x). In this case, an intermedian grade is replaced by another by shifting a row 
on the left. Let gjx
∗  be the replaced grade. This grade is replaced by g(j−1)x
∗ . However 
g(j−1)x
∗ > gjx
∗  (grades being ordered in a decreasing order before evaluating f mm). We then 
have fi
mm(x) > f mm(x) > f mm(y) ⟹ fi
mm(x) > f mm(y). ∎ 
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Definition 3.5 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) Aggregating function f is 
independent from irrelevant alternatives if it establishes that ranking between two candidates 
depends only on voters' preferences (or evaluations) on these candidates. The addition or 
withdrawal of another candidate does not have, in any case, to modify this ranking. 
The non-observance of this criterion is known as Arrow's paradox. When an aggregating 
function does not fulfill this criterion, it is regarded as vulnerable to the Arrow's paradox. This 
paradox is very frequent in elections all over the world. It was observed in particular in the 
United States of America in 2000 (candidature of Ralph Nader supporting Georges Bush 
election against Albert Gore), in 2002 French presidential elections (candidature of Jean-Pierre 
Chevenement hindering Lionel Jospin to reach the second round) and 2007 french presidential 
elections (if there were no socialist candidature or UMP (Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle) 
candidacy, Bayrou would be elected President of the Republic – according to all surveys, he 
was the Condorcet-winner). In DRC, many surveys indicated that a candidate from the 
opposition would probably win the 2011 presidential election against Presidential Majority 
(MP: Majorité Présidentielle) candidate if there were not multiplicity of candidature from the 
opposition. 
Theorem 3.5 : MMCM is independent from irrelevant alternatives. 
Proof: Evaluations by voters are cast on the basis of candidates’ performance independently 
from each other. Thus, if any voter i allot a score or grade gix to candidate x and giy to another 
candidate y such that gix ≥ giy, whatever grade giz she or he allots in addition to candidate z, 
therefore ordrer gix ≥ giy will never be modified ∎ 
In a survey carried out by Jean-François Laslier (2012), experts in Social Choice Theory 
were invited to make a statement on 18 voting systems. These voting systems were regarded as 
candidates for an election of approval voting kind. The winner with this experiment was of 
course the approval voting (AV) with 68.18% of voters (specialists) having approved of it. 
However, the approval voting is a specific case of the evaluation voting (or to some extent 
Range Voting) and of the Majority Judgment (cf. (Smith, 2012)). 
In this Laslier's experiment, Majority Judgment is ranked eighth with 22.73% of voters 
having approved it and evaluation voting ranks eleventh with 9.09% of voters having approved 
it. We show in this article that approval voting is also a specific case of the MMCM. 
Theorem 3.6 : MMCM is equivalent to approval voting as allowed scores are 1 or 0. 
By stating this theorem we want to show that result obtained by MMCM is the same as 
approval voting one if the only authorized scores are 0 (to code “disapproved”) and 1 (to code 
“approved”). As the Laslier's experiment (Laslier, 2012) shows it, that does not guarantee to us 
its acceptance on behalf of all the partisans of the approval voting. Thus, this theorem remains 
only one contribution or an argument to defend the MMCM. 
Proof: If the only allowed scores are 0 and 1, for all x, y two candidates with respective scores 
Gx = {g1x, g2x, … , gnx} and Gy = {g1y, g2y, … , gny} where gij = 0 or 1  ∀ i = 1, … , n, ∀ j = x 
or y.  According to approval voting, x ≻ y if Gx has more “1” (or approvals) than Gy. Let us 
suppose that this result is not corroborated by MMCM i.e. Gx has more “1” than Gy and 
f mm(x) < f mm(y).  This means that ∃ k ≥ 1 such that ℳk(x) includes less “1” than ℳk(y). 
This is absurd according to (Ngoie et al., 2014), ℳk(x) converges to Gx and ℳk(y) to Gy when 
k tends to ν (maximum division index) (cf. Theorem 5.2 in [9]). Since Gx has more “1” than 
Gy, ℳk(x) should include at least as many “1” as ℳk(y). Therefore we must have f
mm(x) >
f mm(y) ⟹ x ≻mm y .  ∎ 
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4. MMCM versus most valuable Social Choice Functions 
It would be better to introduce here a table comparing representative social choice functions 
over some properties. At least, MMCM is compared to BMC and MJ. In table 1 below, “1” in 
a box means that the social choice function on the associate column fulfills criterion on the 
associate line, otherwise we mark down “0”. 
Table 1 Comparing MMCM to most valuable social choice functions 
Properties MMCM MJ BMC AV 
Plurality 
Voting 
Neutrality 1 1 1 1 1 
Anonymity 1 1 1 1 1 
Unanimity 1 1 1 1 1 
Monotonicity 1 1 1 1 0 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternative 1 1 1 1 0 
Generalizing AV 1 1 1 1 0 
High Expressivity from Voter 1 1 1 0 0 
Robustness 1 1 0 0 0 
Majority-Tyranny-Proofness 1 0 1 0 0 
 
Beyond above-mentioned criteria, MMCM still fulfills other fair criteria such as honesty of 
voter (betraying one’s favorite candidate does not pay), allowance of having no opinion vote, 
immunity to candidate cloning, etc. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we outlined a new voting system obtained by combination of Borda Majority 
Count (see (Zahid, 2012)) and Majority Judgment (see (Balinski & Laraki, 2007 ; 2010 ; 2012)). 
The principle of this new method consists in dividing the ordered list of grades in 𝑚 equal parts 
and retaining only bounds of internal parts. Average of selected grades or marks (intermedians) 
is the returned value. It consists in increasing the number of parts in the list of grades (Ngoie et 
al., 2014). The suggested tie-breaking rule differs as well from the BMC as the MJ.  
It was also shown that MMCM fulfills a number of desirable properties which are not 
available for common voting systems. MMCM thus fits incontestably in the list of voting 
functions which are simultaneously monotonic, unanimous, neutral and independent from 
irrelevant alternatives. 
MMCM still fulfills more other criteria which were not referred to in this article. For 
example, it is more likely strategy-proof than BMC or any other form of voting based on the 
summation or the average of grades. 
Indeed, it generalizes the approval voting, one of the most valued functions according to 
many specialists in Social Choice Theory (see (Baujard & Igersheim, 2009; Baujard et al., 2009; 
Laslier & Van der Straeten, 2004)). 
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to Jean-François Laslier (from CNRS, France) for 
constructive discussions about Robust Voting and MJ. They are also grateful to anonymous 
referee(s) for invaluable and useful suggestions. 
References 
Alcantud, J.C.R. and Laruelle, A. (2014), Dis& approval voting: a characterization. Social 
Choice and Welfare, 43(1):1-10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0766-7. 
Arrow, K.J. (1951), Social choice and individual values, Yale University Press. 
Ngoie, R.B.M., Ulungu, B.E.L. (2015), Mean-Median Compromise Method as an innovating votinf 
rule in Social Choice Theory, International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research, 4 (1) (2015) 
177-182. 
 
184 
 
Arrow, K.J. (1963), Social choice and individual values, Yale University Press.  
Balinski, M. and Laraki, R. (2007), A theory of measuring, electing and ranking. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104: 8720-8725. 
Balinski, M. and Laraki, R. (2010), Majority Judgment: measuring, ranking and electing. MIT 
Press. 
Balinski, M. and Laraki, R. (2012) Jugement majoritaire vs vote majoritaire. Cahier 2012-37, 
CNRS.  
Basset, G.W. and Persky, J. (1999), Robust voting. Public Choice, 99:299-310. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018324807861. 
Baujard, A. and Igersheim, H. (2009) Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par 
approbation le 22 avril 2007. Premiers résultats. Revue économique, 60(1):189-201.  
Baujard, A. Gavrel, F., Igersheim, H., Laslier, J.F. and Lebon, I. (2013), Who's favored by 
evaluative voting ? an experiment conducted during the 2012 french presidentiel election. 
Cahier 2013-05, CNRS.  
Durand, S. (2000), Sur quelques paradoxes en Théorie du Choix Social et en décision 
multicritère. PhD thesis, Université Joseph Fourier-Grenoble 1.  
Falco, E. and Garcia-Lapresta, J.L. (2011), A distance-based extension of the majority 
judgement voting system. In Acta Universitatis Belii, Mathematics 18, pages 17-27. 
Falco, E., Garcia-Lapresta, J.L., and Rosello, L. (2013), Allowing voters to be imprecise: à 
proposal using multiple linguistic terms. Information Sciences. 
Falco, E., Garcia-Lapresta, J.L., and Rosello, L. (2014), Aggregating imprecise linguistic 
expressions. In P. Guo and W. Pedrycz, editors, Human-Centric Decision Making Models for 
Social Sciences. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39307-5_5. 
Felsenthal, D.S. (2012). Electoral Systems. Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures, chapter 
3: Review of Paradoxes Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate. Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin Heidelberg. 
Jean, N. (2012), Environnement politique et élections : Une étude des déterminants du vote 
appliquée aux élections municipales françaises. PhD thesis, Université des Sciences et 
Technologies de Lille.  
Laslier, J.F. (2012), Electoral Systems, chapter 13: And the loser is... Plurality Voting. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin Heilderberg.  
Laslier, J.F. and Van der Straeten, K. (2004) ; Une expérience de vote par assentiment. Revue 
française de science politique, 54(1):99-130. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.541.0099. 
Ngoie, R.B.M., Savadogo, Z. and Ulungu, B.E.L. (2014), Median and average as tools for 
measuring, electing and ranking: new prospects. Fundamental Journal of Mathematics and 
Mathematical Sciences, 1(1):9-30. 
Ngoie, R.B.M., Savadogo, Z. and Ulungu, B.E.L. (2015), New Prospects in Social Choice 
Theory: Median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking. Adv. Stud. Contemp. 
Math., 25(1): 19-38. 
Smith, W.D. (2012) Range voting. http://rangevoting.org/RangeVoting.html.  
Zahid, M.A. (2012), A new framework for elections. PhD thesis, Tilburg University. 
